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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DEATH OF AN ORDINANCE:
PORNOGRAPHY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
DEFINED AS SEX DISCRIMINATION
Today, many citizens from all segments of the population are con-
cerned about pornography's harm to society. Feminists are some of the
foremost opponents of pornography because they view the contents of
such materials as discriminatory against women.' They maintain that
pornography perpetuates inequality between women and men because it
influences the values and socialization of its audience, and ultimately,
society as a whole.2
Reactions against pornography can be seen even at the local level.
The Indianapolis City Council, after listening to feminists' testimony at a
hearing, enacted an ordinance3 which was the central controversy in
American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut.4 The stated purpose of
the ordinance was "to prevent and prohibit all discriminatory practices
of sexual subordination or inequality through pornography."5 The Sev-
1. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985).
2. Id.
3. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984). This ordinance provides in part:
[P]ornography shall mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being
raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised
or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into
body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these
conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, ex-
ploitation, possession, or use, through postures or positions of servility or submission
or display.
The ordinance also provides that the "use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of
women in paragraphs (1) through (6) above shall also constitute pornography under this sec-
tion." Additionally, the ordinance contains four prohibitions: one may not "traffic" in por-
nography; one may not "coerce" others into performing in pornography; one may not "force"
pornography on anyone; and, one may not injure another in a way that is directly caused by
pornography. INDIANAPOLIS, IND. CODE § 16-3(q)(4-7) (1984).
4. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1664 (1986).
5. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (S.D. Ind.
1984), (citing INDIANAPOLIS, IND. CODE § 16-1(b)(8) (1984)).
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals held the ordinance was unconstitutional.
The court explained that the statute sought to censor speech by restrict-
ing pornography and thereby violated the first amendment.
The plaintiffs in Hudnut were publishers, distributors, and readers
of books, magazines and films. They contended that Indianapolis' por-
nography ordinance violated the first amendment's guarantee of freedom
of speech.6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indi-
ana concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional.7 The district
court held that the ordinance regulated speech rather than the conduct
involved in making pornography.' The district court also said that Indi-
anapolis did not establish that sex discrimination against women was a
compelling enough interest to justify the regulation of speech.9 Conse-
quently, the ordinance was struck down.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
holding that the pornography ordinance was unconstitutional."° The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that Indianapolis' definition of "pornography"
was considerably different from the usual definition of "obscenity" which
has traditionally been held to be unprotected by the first amendment."
The Seventh Circuit discussed the usual analytic approach' 2 taken with
the term "obscenity" and concluded that the Indianapolis ordinance
failed to fit within this measuring tool. Because they found that the ordi-
nance discriminated on the ground of the content of speech, the opinion
stopped short of the usual balancing analysis typically involved with
evaluating obscenity.
The Seventh Circuit viewed the ordinance as "thought control"' 3
because it regulated the content of speech, and thereby violated the first
amendment. The opinion explained that the government cannot ordain a
preferred viewpoint or perspective. 14 It stated that although the inequal-
ity of women may be a "pernicious" belief, under our Constitution, such
a belief may prevail.' 5 The government has no power to restrict expres-
6. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327.
7. Id. at 326.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 334.
11. Id. at 324.
12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
13. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 328.
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sion because of its message or ideas.' 6 The Seventh Circuit went on to
say that the ordinance established an "approved" view of women, and
issues (like pornography) that shape culture and socialization cannot be
controlled by government censorship.' 7
At the end of the opinion, the court recognized that the City and
feminists were trying to change the existing "culture of power." It rea-
soned that restrictions on speech stifle change and that free speech is the
best way to bring about the desired improvement.' 8
Lastly, the court discussed the salvageability of the ordinance. It
concluded that only a complete legislative rewrite of the ordinance would
remedy its unconstitutional nature.' 9
Upon defendants' appeal, the United States Supreme Court summa-
rily affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision. E0 A subsequent petition for
rehearing was denied.2"
ANALYSIS
In Western culture, women have traditionally been viewed as
subordinate to men. In the last hundred years, however, great strides
have been made toward equality. Nevertheless, some inequities still re-
main. Many women's rights activists feel that pornography is a vehicle
for the continued subordination of women in our society.2 These femi-
nists want to eliminate all materials which perpetuate the traditional in-
equities between the sexes. They view all books, magazines, and films
which portray women in a degrading fashion as pornography. 3 To the
feminists, then, the elimination of pornography is simply a means to an
end in the quest for equality. 4
Feminists have had a great influence on legislatures all over the
country.25 They have compiled testimonials from thousands of women
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 332.
19. Id.
20. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
21. Id. at 1664 (1986).
22. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I
(1985).
23. However, feminists are not entirely opposed to sexually explicit materials. "'Erotica" is
sexually explicit, yet premised on equality between the sexes. Hence, it is not discrimination
against women, and therefore, not pornography. Id. at 22.
24. Id. at 27.
25. The same group involved in the creation of the Indianapolis ordinance was also influ-
ential in the enactment of a Minneapolis Civil Rights ordinance. The ordinance was passed
twice by the city council (in 1983 and 1984), but was vetoed by the mayor both times. MINNF-
1987]
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who have been harmed by pornography, as well as hundreds of studies
which conclude that pornography is indeed harmful to women. 26 The
Indianapolis City Council was quite receptive to the information these
activists offered them. The City agreed with the feminists that pornogra-
phy constitutes discrimination against women. 27 In a daring and politi-
cally innovative move, Indianapolis enacted an ordinance which defined
pornography as "the subordination of women."'2' Even before the ordi-
nance went into effect, numerous parties filed suit against the mayor of
Indianapolis, contending that the ordinance violated the first amendment
right of free speech.29
Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit struck down the
ordinance as unconstitutional.3" The Seventh Circuit dealt with this
novel legislation in a very traditional and conservative manner.3' Instead
of capitalizing on this opportunity for innovation, the Seventh Circuit
clung exclusively to the first amendment and the limits of precedent. It
considered the notion of equality between the sexes (advocated in the
statute) as one perspective or viewpoint.32
Admittedly, a portion of society may deny women's equality to men.
However, not only is equality between the sexes the "approved" view-
point of the Indianapolis ordinance 3 but it is also mandated by the
APOLIS, MINN. ORDINANCE amending tit. 7, chs. 139 & 141 (adding subparagraph to
§ 139.20).
26. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985).
27. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1319-20.
28. INDIANAPOLIS, IND. CODE § 16-3(q) (1984).
29. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1664 (1986). The plaintiffs in the case
included the American Booksellers Ass'n which comprised 5200 bookstores and chains; the
Association for American Publishers which includes most of the country's publishers; Video
Shack, Inc., which sells and rents video cassettes in Indianapolis; Kelly Bentley, a resident of
Indianapolis who reads books and watches films; the Council for Periodical Distributors
Ass'ns, which comprises over 500 distributors of all types of reading materials; the Freedom to
Read Foundation, a nonprofit organization established to promote and defend first amendment
rights; the International Periodical Distributors Ass'n, Inc., a trade association for periodical
distributors; the Koch News Co., the largest wholesale distributor in Indianapolis of books and
periodicals; the National Ass'n of College Stores, Inc., a trade association of college stores; and
the Omega Satellite Products Co., a distributor of television programming received from satel-
lite transmissions.
30. Id.
31. The beginning of the opinion gets very bogged down in a discussion of "obscenity"
and its determination. The ordinance purposely goes into great detail to describe what por-
nography entails for the express purpose of avoiding such an analysis. MacKinnon, Pornogra-
phy, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 21-22.
32. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328.
33. Id.
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United States Constitution.3 4 Thus, conspicuously absent from the
court's opinion was any discussion of the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee against discrimination on the basis of sex. Instead, the court hid
behind the veil of the first amendment's guarantee of free speech.
The court dismissed the City's contention that actresses are physi-
cally injured while making pornographic films. It declared that the
images of pain on the screen were mere depictions35 -no one believed
that the actresses had actually suffered. Many documented studies and
personal testimonials reveal that beatings, rapes, and even murders actu-
ally take place in front of the camera while pornography is being
filmed.3 6 Contrary to the court's suggestion, these harmful acts are not
just special effects. "Sex is forced on real women so that it can be sold for
a profit to be forced on other real women."3 "
The court stated that it accepted the premise behind this legislation
that some pornography may be harmful. Nevertheless, in striking down
the ordinance it stated that allowing more speech may be a more effective
remedy than restriction would be.3" The court reasoned that the prolifer-
ation of pornography will allow the truth as to its harmful character to
surface.3 9 Surely, more pornography promises to perpetuate the inequi-
table and harmful situation. Only with more expression opposing por-
nography by feminists and other activists will the harms created by it
subside.
Next the Seventh Circuit tackled the City's argument that pornogra-
phy is "low value" speech and enough like obscenity to warrant its prohi-
bition.4 It recognized that "[s]ome cases hold that speech far removed
from politics and other subjects at the core of the Framers' concerns may
be subjected to special regulation." 4' The court cited cases that dealt
with restricting vile, offensive language as examples.42 These obscenity
cases were distinguished from Hudnut because they, "do not sustain stat-
utes that select among viewpoints."43 The court failed to recognize that
the determination of what constitutes "vile" language is subjective and
varies among different segments of our society. Under the Seventh Cir-
34. U.S. CONrS. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 330.
36. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985).
37. Id. at 21.
38. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331.
39. Id. at 330.
40. Id. at 331.
41. Id.
42. Id. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
43. Id.
1987]
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cuit's reasoning, to state what is "vile" language is to select among view-
points. Consequently, these cases are not so distinguishable.
Nevertheless, the court rebutted the City's "low value" contention
by stating that pornography is so influential on society that it is pre-
cluded from being "low value" speech.' It confused the magnitude of
the problem with the problem itself. The court was apprehensive to try
to solve the problem of pornography because the problem is so pervasive
and overwhelming. In the end, the court chose to do nothing.
The majority of this opinion dealt with the cost of restricting the
speech at issue: pornography. When confronted with analyzing the
value of pornography, the Seventh Circuit erroneously reached the con-
clusion that pornography could be valuable speech.45 The court ex-
pressly refused to balance the value of the speech against the burden of
the restriction,46 perhaps to avoid the embarrassment of committing ana-
lytical suicide.
Freedom of expression is a right that most Americans cherish. The
judiciary is obligated to protect this right under its mandate to uphold
the Constitution. Nevertheless, some restrictions of freedom of speech
are necessary to preserve other rights guaranteed by the Constitution
which are equally as compelling.47 Equality for all people and the right
to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex are important enough
values to justify the restriction of pornography.4"
In Hudnut, however, the ordinance in controversy was admittedly
quite broad. As the court explained, many classic literary works handed
down in our culture would fall within the ordinance's definition of por-
nography.49 Allowing this ordinance to take effect would create a flood
of litigation. Although the Seventh Circuit's reasoning was quite weak, it
probably came to the correct result.5 0
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 332.
47. E.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography can be criminally
banned); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent radio broadcasts can be regu-
lated through FCC licensing); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (exhibi-
tion of sexually explicit films may be regulated by zoning); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (sex-designated ads may be prohibited under local sex
discrimination statute).
48. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985).
49. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325. For example, the court cites James Joyce's ULYSSES and
Homer's ILLIAD as both depicting women as submissive objects for conquest and domination.
50. The courts could have justifiably allowed the ordinance to take effect because a ripe-
ness issue was involved. Ripeness embodies a principle that cases should not be tried prema-
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Subsection six of the Indianapolis statute is particularly broad.51 It
includes in the definition of pornography materials in which "[w]omen
are portrayed as sexual objects. . . ." Perhaps an elimination of this
subsection would aid the statute in withstanding a constitutional attack.
Clearly, many of the classic literary works that concerned the court
would not be in violation of Indianapolis' definition of pornography with-
out this subsection.
Additionally, the ordinance would be strengthened if it were worded
throughout to include the sexual subordination of all people (women,
men, and children) and not just women. In so doing, the statute may be
constitutional because of its more obvious inclusion of restrictions on
child pornography which have been held constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court.5"
IMPLICATIONS
The Indianapolis ordinance, although defeated, was significant be-
cause it represented women activists' continued pressure for equality.
Despite the ruling in Hudnut, feminists will undoubtedly continue to ex-
ert pressure on legislatures to eliminate sex discrimination. Women, con-
cerned with inequities in our society, will persist until discrimination is
eliminated. Some of the feminists will remain influential in the legal sys-
tem, while others may pursue unlawful means to effectuate change.53
New anti-pornography and anti-discrimination statutes that are nar-
rower in scope need to be proposed, enacted, and tested in the courts.
Litigation pertaining to the harms caused by pornography will continue.
turely. The issue of ripeness in Hudnut arose because the plaintiffs had filed suit before the
ordinance ever went into effect.
It has been clear that even when suits of this kind involve a 'case in controversy'
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Article III of the Constitution, the task of
analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies... before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). In Hudnut both the district court and the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that since the effects of the ordinance were easily predictable, the case was
ripe for adjudication and the court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in Hudnut,
106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1664 (1986), and hence, the flood of litigation
that would have ensued once the ordinance took effect was avoided.
51. Section 16-3(q)(6) provides: "(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domina-
tion, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of
servility or submission or display." INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q)(6) (1984). Women
have been presented in this manner throughout history. Western culture is permeated with the
subordination of women, and its literature is inextricably interwoven with the notions of sub-
paragraph (6). It would be unrealistic, as well as unreasonable, to ban this heritage.
52. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
53. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at
19871
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The courts will be repeatedly asked to define the limits of the first amend-
ment until women are no longer harmed and subordinated by pornogra-
phy and a satisfactory resolution to the problem is obtained.
Derian Dombrow
